摘要
在日本,公司治理的效力很早以前就成为较大的问题,很多人认为日本的许多经营者监督机制并没有发挥应有的作用,而是存在很多漏洞,这是因为日本的法律和现实情况之间存在很大的距离,比如日本的法律规定股东大会选任监事和董事,董事会和监事对董事或者代表董事进行监督,而在现实情况中,社长把握着极大的权力,可以选任自己的部下作为监事和董事,甚至在退休之后都可以垂帘听政。因此,20世纪90年代以后,日本引进了美国式的公司治理制度,但是这种公司治理制度改革不能认为是很成功的,以日本的失败经验为基础分析中国大型国有公司的公司治理问题很有参考价值,这就是日本没有从三个"谁"的视点进行改革。
In Japan, the effectiveness of corporate governance remains a major problem since the mecha- nism of monitoring management failed to play and many loopholes existed due to huge differences between Jap- anese laws and reality. In accordance with the Japanese corporate law, supervisors and directors should be e- lected in shareholders＇ general meeting, and accordingly, the board of directors and supervisors should moni- tor directors and representative directors. However in reality, the president controls preponderant power to e- lect his own supervisors and directors and such control still lasts long after the president＇ s retirement. Al- though Japan has introduced American model of corporate governance since 1990s, the reform is not quite sat- isfying. With regard to the corporate governance on China＇ s giant State - owned companies, Japan＇ s failure experience that Japan failed to reform by means of questioning the three ＂who＂ , may offer valuable reference to China.
出处
《北方法学》
CSSCI
2013年第1期80-88,共9页
Northern Legal Science
关键词
日本
公司治理
三个“谁”
国有企业
Japan corporate governance question of three ＂who＂ State - owned companies
