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低碳发展模式下政府和企业的动态博弈分析

Dynamic Analysis of the Game between Government and Enterprises in Low-carbon Economy
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摘要 针对企业现阶段发展的实际情况,建立了一个关于政府对企业实施低碳生产激励与否、企业实施低碳生产与否和政府对企业是否进行低碳生产决定奖惩与否的两方三阶段的动态博弈模型,并求出该模型的均衡解。然后通过对均衡解的分析得出我国企业发展低碳经济的必要条件,并由此提出政府在企业进行低碳生产过程中的重要性。最后提出了有助于我国企业发展低碳经济的政策和建议。 According to the actual situation of enterprises current stage of development, a two-party and three-stage dynamic game model between government and enterprise has been established on whether the government stimulates the enterprises involved in low-carbon pro- duction, whether the enterprises have implemented the low-carbon production, and whether the government has executed reward and punishment on enterprises with and without low-car- bon production. Meanwhile the equilibrium solution of the model has been acquired. Then through the analysis of the equilibrium solution, the paper discovers the necessary conditions for China to develop the low-carbon economy, disclosing the importance of the government in the low-carbon development. Finally, the policies and suggestions are proposed to realize the low carbon development of our country.
作者 柏娟萍
出处 《金陵科技学院学报(社会科学版)》 2012年第4期54-58,共5页 Journal of Jinling Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词 政府和企业 低碳 动态博弈 government and enterprises low-carbon dynamic game
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