摘要
当前传统零售商纷纷发展在线销售渠道并广泛采用供应商代发货的经营模式,这进一步增强了零售商的终端优势。以家电和快速消费品为代表的行业中,零售商正在逐步从生产商手中夺取主导权,零售商与供应商的关系受到供应链主导权位置的影响而变得更加复杂。本文针对这种复杂供应链现实问题,开发出包含承诺费的零售商双渠道协调机制,计算获得供应商主导和零售商主导两种不同情况下的供应链协调优化策略。通过对比供应商主导和零售商主导供应链的利润构成情况,我们发现供应链成员可以通过主导权为自己谋取更大利润;供应商主导型供应链的整体利润水平高于零售商主导型供应链。原因在于零售商使用主导权时激励供应商提高产量,又不完全确定自己的订购量,会导致供应商产生可能的缺货成本或产品过剩造成的浪费;零售商主导型供应链中供应商的产量更大。
It is a common practice for retailers to develop multiple channels to serve different customers. The retailers are competing for market dominance in many industries such as appliance and fast moving consumer goods. Internet shopping and drop shipping are two new trends in the retailing industry. This paper proposes that commitment contracts be established for both supplier-led and retailer- led supply chains from the perspective of supply chain management. In the supplier-led supply chain, if the retailer＇s order quantity achieves centralized level the profit of the supply chain can be maximized. In the retailer-led supply chain, the retailer can inspire the supplier to achieve optimal production quantity. The profit of a supply chain can also be maximized. We contrast two kinds of dominant positions and their corresponding solutions. Drop-shipping is a commonly adopted order fulfillment strategy for retailer＇s online distribution channel or part store-based channel. Because of the coexistence of store-based distribution network and web site distribution network, the retailer needs to prepare two kinds of inventories, its own inventory and the drop-shipping inventory. In addition to different dominant positions, the relationship between the retailer and the supplier becomes more complicated than＇ before. We consider a supply chain in which a supplier sells a product to a retailer. The retailer uses both physical stores and online channels to reach their final consumers. We research two kinds of supply chain structures： supplier-led supply chain and retailer-led supply chain. In the supplier-led supply chain, the supplier acts as the leader and the retailer as the follower. The supplier decides commitment fee and wholesale price of drop shipping to optimize profit for itself and the whole supply chain. The retailer only decides the order quantity for its own inventory and drop shipping inventory. The supplier produces according to the order quantity of retailer. In the retailer-led supply chain, the retailer decides the order quantity, commitment fee and wholesale price of drop shipping to optimize profit for itself and the whole supply chain, The supplier decides its production quantity. We assume that the drop shipper has no production capacity limit. We focus on such complicated dual channel and drop shipping supply chain. First, we consider the coordination in decentralized and centralized contexts. Second, we propose the commitment contracts for both supplier-led and retailer-led supply chain scenarios. We compare supplier-led supply chain with retailer-led supply chain. Our analysis shows that supply chain members can take advantage of dominant positions to receive more profit. The supplier can receive more profit in supplier-led supply chain than retailer-led supply chain. In contrast, the retailer receives more profit in retailer-led supply chain than supplier-led supply chain. Because of incentives from retailer, the production quantity of supplier in the retailer-led supply chain is greater than that in the supplier-led supply chain. This finding can help explain that dominant retailers usually lead to excess production capacity as observed in China.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第1期171-177,共7页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家社科基金青年资助项目(11CGL031)
教育部人文社科青年基金资助项目(10YJC630408)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71002020)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171149)
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70832005)
关键词
双渠道
承诺契约
主导权
代发货
dual-distribution channel
commitment contract
dominant position
drop shipping
