摘要
本文利用国家统计局公布的制造业大中型企业年度财务数据,实证考察了我国非上市公司的治理问题,对相关治理机制的有效性进行检验。本文的研究表明,不同于上市公司主要依靠董事会等内部治理机制和信息披露等外部监管,控股股东的特征在我国非上市公司治理中的作用尤为突出。外部法律制度环境的改善将显著降低非上市公司的代理成本,而税务实施在非上市公司的治理中扮演重要的公司治理角色,成为目前我国经济转型阶段可资借鉴的重要的法律外制度。本研究为我国非上市公司治理问题以及相关治理机制的有效性提供了较早的证据。
This paper explores the governance problems in the Chinese non -listed firms and evaluates the ef- fectiveness of the governance mechanisms of these firms by using the annual financial data about large - and - middle - scale manufacturing firms collected by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. The results show that the nature of controlling shareholders has significant effects on the agency cost of the Chinese non - listed firms, which is consistent with the evidence from the Chinese listed firms. The agency problems have been alleviated to some extent due to the introduction of private share and shareholders from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and foreign countries, rather than the existence of multiple ownerships implied by the previous literature. External institutional environment, including legal investor protection and market development, would facilitate reducing the agency costs of Chinese non - listed firms and it thus provides a new evidence for LLSV＇s proposition that le- gal investor protection does matter in improving corporate governance based on the evidence from the Chinese non - listed firms. Tax enforcement, as an extra - legal institution, would play a critical role of corporate gov- ernance in the Chinese non - listed firms and it could therefore be one of the important extra - legal institutions that can be employed in improving corporate governance during the economic transition period in China.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第2期142-155,共14页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
中国人民大学明德青年学者计划项目(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目批准号11XNJ027)对本项研究的支助
关键词
非上市公司
公司治理
税务实施
Non - listed corporations, Corporate governance, Tax enforcement
