高管金融联结背景的企业贷款融资:由A股非金融类上市公司观察被引量：33

Corporate Financing on Loan on the Background of Top Managers’ Financial Ties:Observed by the A-Share Non-Financial Listed Companies

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摘要基于2000～2010年A股非金融类上市公司高管金融联结与企业贷款融资数据对高管金融联结对企业贷款融资影响的研究发现,高管金融联结对企业贷款融资行为有显著影响,即与不具有高管金融联结的企业相比,具有高管金融联结的企业可以获得较多的贷款融资数额,以及支付较低的贷款融资成本;对于民营企业(较之国有企业)以及地处金融市场化程度欠发达地区的企业而言,高管金融联结对贷款融资数额的正向影响越强,对贷款融资成本的负向影响越强。 Based on the executives of financial bond and loan data of A-share non-financial listing Corporation form 2000 to 2010, the paper explores the influence of top managers＇ financial ties on corporate financing on loan. Through the study we can find that： top managers＇ financial ties significantly influence the behavior of corporate financing, that＇s it, compared with the corporate with no top managers＇ financial ties, the corporate with the top managers＇ financial ties may acquire the larger amount of loan, and pay the lower cost of loan; as far as the private corporate （compared with the stated owned corporate） and the corporate in less developed financial market （compared with the comparatively developed financial market） are concerned, the positive relationship between top managers＇ financial ties and the amount of loan is stronger, and the negative relationship between top managers＇ financial ties and the cost of loan is stronger.

作者陈仕华马超

机构地区东北财经大学工商管理学院

出处《改革》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第4期111-119,共9页 Reform

基金国家自然科学基金青年项目"企业网络视角下的公司治理:基于连锁董事的研究"(批准号:71002093) 国家社会科学基金重大招标项目"完善国有控股金融机构公司治理研究"(批准号:10zd&035) 国家社会科学基金青年项目"转轨经济背景下的媒体治理与投资者保护的理论与实证研究"(批准号:12CGL027)

关键词高管金融联结企业贷款融资企业融资 top managers＇ financial ties corporate financing on loan business finance

分类号 F830.42 [经济管理—金融学]

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