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制造业股权结构对企业非效率投资的影响研究 被引量:9

A Study of the Influence of Ownership Structure of Manufacturing Industry on the Ineffective Investment of Enterprises
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摘要 近些年我国企业非效率投资现象严重,主要表现为投资不足和过度投资。通过对股权分置改革完成后制造业上市公司的股权结构对企业非效率投资的影响的研究,发现国有股在一定程度上可以抑制企业的投资支出水平和过度投资,容易造成投资不足,但是如果第一大股东为国有股则容易造成过度投资;法人股持股比例提高能够有效地抑制过度投资,但也容易造成投资不足;社会公众股持股比例越高,投资支出水平越高,容易造成过度投资,不易造成投资不足;第一大股东持股比例越高,投资支出水平和过度投资水平越高,投资不足水平越低。 Ineffective investment is getting worse in China’s enterprises in recent years,mainly in the form of inadequate investment and over-investment.This article studies the influence of ownership structure of the listed companies in the manufacturing industry after the completion of the split-share reform on the business ineffective investment.It was found that state-owned shares can curb the level of corporate investment and over-investment to some extent,at the same time,it also easily leads to underinvestment;but if the first shareholder owns state-owned shares,it will easily cause overinvestment.The increase of the corporate shares in the shareholding ratio can inhibit over-investment effectively,but it will also easily lead to insufficient investment.The higher shareholding ratio of public shares and higher level of investment spending will easily lead to overinvestment,instead of insufficient investment.The higher shareholding ratio of the first majority shareholder and the higher level of investment spending and over-investment will lead to lower level of insufficient investment.
作者 韦琳 石华
出处 《江西财经大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第2期5-16,共12页 Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(70940010) 天津市社科规划基金项目(TJGL11-119)
关键词 股权结构 非效率投资 过度投资 投资不足 ownership structure ineffective investment over-investment inadequate investment
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