摘要
控制股东与小股东之间的利益冲突是我国上市公司中存在的主要问题。我国股利分配失衡问题归根究底在于公司内部缺乏适当的权利制衡机制,存在内部人特别是控制股东侵害小股东合法利益的问题,这是公司治理机制不完善不健全的结果。我国与再融资行为相挂钩的上市公司现金分红制度具固有缺陷。依据股利代理成本理论,公司现金分红是小股东利益保护机制的结果,只有小股东利益保护机制得以有效执行,我国上市公司的股利分配失衡问题才能迎刃而解。应当尊重公司自治原则,通过契约设计和制度创新来增强公司股东对现金分红决策的参与度,对大股东权利的行使形成有效的制衡;同时,强化特定情形下控制股东的诚信义务,发展股东强制股利分配之诉,对上市公司控制股东滥用控制权侵害小股东利益的行为进行责任追究是我国解决股利分配失衡问题的必然出路。
Conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is a major agency problem listed companies are faced with.In China problems concerning bonus distribution chiefly lie in the fact that for companies there lacks an interior right regulation mechanism which will inevitably result in insiders,especially,controlling shareholders infringe minority shareholders＇ interest.Chinese listed companies carrying out refinance activities are of inherent defect in their cash dividends.Only where minority shareholders＇ interest is well protected can the problem of listed companies＇ cash dividends be appropriately settled.We should comply with companies＇ autonomy principle and effectively control majority shareholders＇ rights through properly entering into agreement and establishing system so as to encourage shareholders＇ participating in policy making of cash dividends.Meanwhile,stressing shareholders＇ good faith obligation in some specific circumstances,improving compulsory cash dividends litigation,and ensuring controlling shareholders to be liable for abuse of manipulation to infringe minority shareholders＇ interest are deemed proper way to settle the problem of cash dividends.
出处
《现代法学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第2期161-170,共10页
Modern Law Science
关键词
股利代理成本理论
现金分红
小股东利益保护
强制股利分配之诉
cash dividends agency cost theory
cash dividend
protection of minority shareholders＇ interest
compulsory cash dividends litigation
