摘要
在返乡农民工的创业决策过程中,存在着农民工与地方政府这两类博弈主体,为研究相关要素对返乡农民工创业问题中主体行为演化的影响,借助演化博弈理论,构建了返乡农民工与地方政府交互过程的演化模型,分析了特定情形下返乡农民工和地方政府行为交互系统的均衡点及其稳定性。研究发现:返乡农民工创业演化系统收敛于两种模式,随着系统相关参数的变动,系统收敛于不同模式的概率发生显著变化,通过调节相关参数可以优化返乡农民工创业路径的演化,引导系统朝着"理想"模式发展。
There are two types of game-agents, namely returned migrant workers and the local govern- ments, in the entrepreneurial decision-making process of returned peasant laborers. In order to research the impact of some factors on the behavior of subjects, a game model on interaction between returned mi- grant workers and the local governments is constructed using the evolutionary game theory. Equilibrium points and the stability under a specific condition are discussed. The results show that the evolution path of the system converges to two modes, the converging probabilities change markedly when the related pa- rameters alter. We can optimize the entrepreneurial route of returned migrant workers and lead the system towards the expected direction by adjusting the related parameters.
出处
《华南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2013年第2期58-63,共6页
Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71073070
71171099)
国家社会科学重大招标项目(11&ZD169)
教育部博士点基金项目"大学生农村就业意愿与行为研究"(20103227110015)
江苏省高校"青蓝工程"项目
江苏省"333工程"项目
关键词
返乡农民工
创业决策
演化博弈
制度分析与设计
returned migrant workers
entrepreneurial decision-making
evolution game theory
institu- tional analysis and design
