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考虑成本变动情形的多属性逆向拍卖利润分配

Profits Allocation in Multi-attribute Reverse Auctions Considering Cost Variation
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摘要 针对成本变动情形下的多属性逆向拍卖利润分配问题,分别构建了非合作与合作博弈模型,分析了建立和保持合作关系的条件以及成本变动对利润分配和采供双方合作条件的影响,确定了最优利润分配比例。结论表明:若满足合作基本条件,且交易成本和生产成本在特定的范围内变动,采供双方可获得合作利润增量;合作情形下的利润分配比例,受双方风险态度的影响,与讨价还价能力无关。 Focused on profits allocation between supplier and buyer in multi-attribute reverse auctions considering the cost variation, non-cooperative and cooperative game models are constructed, with the conditions analysed to establish and maintain buyer-supplier relationship, and the impact of the cost variation on profits allocation and the conditions for both sides to cooperate with cach other discussed. Finally, the optimal proportion of profits allocation is determined. The results show that buyer and supplier will obtain incremental profits in cooperation if the basic conditions of cooperation are met,and the transaction costs and the production costs change within a certain range. The proportion of profits allocation is affected by the risk attitudes of both sides,but nothing to do with their bargaining powers.
作者 陈曲 田剑
出处 《世界科技研究与发展》 CSCD 2013年第2期274-278,314,共6页 World Sci-Tech R&D
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究规划(10YJA630143) 江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目(CXLX12_0703)资助
关键词 逆向拍卖 利润分配 成本变动 采供关系 multi-attribute reverse auction profits allocation cost variation buyer-supplier relationship
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