摘要
针对自由骑问题,提出一种基于全局信任值的激励机制,以激励节点积极贡献、可靠服务。在大规模的P2P网络中,节点间交易的随机性造成建立重复博弈的概率极低,导致TfT(Tit-for-Tat)策略失效。节点的全局信任值能够反映节点对网络贡献大小与服务质量好坏,基于节点间全局信任值的差异设置服务响应规则、查询转发规则以及邻居选择规则,形成一种普适性更强的激励机制,间接体现TfT策略。仿真实验表明,这种激励机制能够抑制自由骑,鼓励节点共享资源。
Aiming at the flee-tiding problem, an incentive mechanism based on the global trust value of nodes was proposed to encourage nodes to contribute actively and service dependably. The randomicity of trades between nodes results in the probability to build up a repeated game is very low, and brings about the TIT （Tit-for-Tat） strategy to loss effect in the large-scale P2P network. Global trust values of nodes can reflect their contribution and service quality to networks. Based on the difference of global trust values between nodes, some rules including response of service, forward of query and selection of neighbor are established to form an incentive mechanism which has good universality and reflect the TfT strategy indirectly. Simulations show the incentive mechanism can suppress free-riders and encourage nodes to share resources.
出处
《系统仿真学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第5期1046-1052,共7页
Journal of System Simulation
基金
国家自然科学基金(60973127)
湖南省教育厅科研项目(10C0759
07A024)
湖南省自然科学基金(10JJ2044)
湖南省高校科技创新团队支持计划资助(湘教通[2012]318号)
关键词
对等网络
激励机制
自由骑
全局信任值
peer-to-peer network
incentive mechanism
flee-riding
global trust value
