摘要
本文着眼于独立董事个体视角,对上市公司虚假陈述案件中独立董事遭受监管处罚这一现象进行研究。使用2003～2010年证监会和交易所的处罚数据,我们发现有302人/次的独立董事因虚假陈述而招致监管处罚,但其处罚程度要显著轻于非独立董事。研究还发现,49%的受罚独立董事在处罚年度末之前便已离开涉案公司,但独立董事的提前离职并未降低其日后的处罚程度。研究还发现,独立董事受罚后其担任的董事职位数量有明显下降,但其背后的原因更可能是受罚独立董事主动离开高风险上市公司的结果。最后,处罚宣告日前后短窗口内独立董事任职的其他上市公司并未出现明显的股价下跌。
From the perspective of the individual independent directors(ID),in this paper,we have studied the phenomena that the ID suffered from penalties in the process of the case of listed-eompany s fraud statement.Bv the use of the data on the sanctions of CSRC and two stock exchanges from 2003 to 2010,we have found that 302 person-times of ID have been punished by the supervision department because of the fraud statement,and that the degree of this punishment to them has been noticeably lighter than that of non-ID.By our research,we have also discovered that 49% punished ID have left the companies involved in the ease mentioned above,and that their leaving office ahead of time has not reduced the degree of punishment at a later date.By our study,we have also found that the number of the director position has dropped perceptively after the punishment to the ID,and the reason behind this phenomenon is more likely to be the results of the fact that the punished ID have left,of their own accord,the listed company with high risks.Before and after the announcement date of the punishment,in a short period,the stock price of other listed companies in which the ID have held office has not obviously dropped.
出处
《管理世界》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第5期131-143,175,共14页
Journal of Management World
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目(71232004)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272087)
中央高校基本科研业务费项目(CDJSK100209)资助
