摘要
激励相容的银行监管是使监管者、银行和社会公众效用最大的一种监管模式。银行与监管部门、社会公众与银行之间都存在委托代理关系,如何利用已知的不完全信息激励代理人做出使委托人效用最大行动,是激励相容要解决的问题。通过对金融监管中各参与者的博弈分析,认为在存在道德风险和信息不对称的前提下,监管当局提供的有效监管激励缺失以及不合理的制度安排是造成监管效率低下的主要原因。只有加快建立激励相容的银行监管机制,提高银行监管的有效性,才能顺应国际金融的发展形势,提高我国在国际金融体系中的地位。
Incentive compatibility is a supervision pattern that maximizes the effectiveness of regulatory agencies, banks and the public. As there is a principal-agent relation between supervising departments, the public and banks, how to inspire an agent to maximize the client effectiveness by means of known and incomplete information is a problem for incentive compatibility to resolve. Through a game analysis of the participants in financial supervision, it is found that the missing of effective supervision incentives by supervisory authorities and unreasonable system arrangement are the main causes of low supervision efficiency. Only by accelerating the building of a bank su- pervision mechanism of incentive compatibility, and raise the effectiveness of bank supervision, could China adapt to the international fi- nancial development trend and increase the status in the international financial system
出处
《商业经济》
2013年第11期113-114,127,共3页
Business & Economy
基金
黑龙江省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(12512072)
黑龙江省高等教育教学改革工程项目(8344)
哈尔滨商业大学青年骨干教师科研创新项目
黑龙江省普通高等学校青年学术骨干支持计划(1251G027)
黑龙江省高等教育教学改革项目(JG2012010327)
关键词
激励相容
商业银行
监管有效性
研究综述
incentive compatibility, commercial banks, supervision effectiveness, study review
