期刊文献+

论职工持股计划的缺陷性——兼评国有资产流失的原因 被引量:2

ON DEFECTS OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS
下载PDF
导出
摘要 中国现已停止实施职工持股计划 (ESOPs) ,但在西方国家 ,却普遍认为 ESOPs具有不少优点 ,特别是对职工的激励作用 ,因而日益受到人们的重视。随着中国证券市场的发展 ,中国是否也应该实施 ESOPs?文章认为 ,我国不必重新启用 ESOPs,因它具有三个不可克服的内在的缺陷性。实施长期 ESOPs的企业 ,会使其市场价值增加 ,但这部份增加的价值是职工股持有人无法获得的资本利得和无法转移的持有风险的价值。国有股其性质相当于此类ESOPs,导致国有资产的流失。实施短期的 ESOPs会诱发内幕信息的产生 ,违背了资本市场的“公平、公开、公正”的原则。事实上 ,ESOPs对职工无激励作用而言。因此 ,应永久性停止使用 WT5”BZ]Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) are not carried out in China now.But they have been increasingly valued in Western countries,because it is widely regarded that there is much merit in ESOPs,especially in being incentives to employees.With the development of Chinese securities market,should ESOPs be carried out in China again? This paper points out that China should not resume ESOPs, for there are three defects that cannot be eliminated in ESOPs. The market value of the firm with long term ESOPs will increase, but this increased value is the value of capital gains that Employee Stockowners cannot own and they cannot transfer it.Naturally speaking, the state owned shares are similar to the long term ESOPs, and cause the loss of state owned assets. The short term ESOPs can result in the production of inside information, and break the principles of “fairness, openness and justice” on the capital market.Thirdly, ESOPs have no incentives to employees at all. Therefore, the ESOPs should not be put in practice for all time. [WT5”HZ]
出处 《天津大学学报(社会科学版)》 2000年第3期178-182,共5页 Journal of Tianjin University:Social Sciences
关键词 职工持股计划 企业 国有资产流失 缺陷性 股票 employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) market value of the firm capital market incentit
  • 相关文献

参考文献13

  • 1Baxter, Nevins D. Leverage, Risk of Ruin and The Cost of Capital[J]. Journal of Finance, Sept, 1967,22: 395-404.
  • 2Come M A, Blasi J, Kruse D,Jampani R. Financial Returns of Public ESOPs Companies: Investor Effects vs. Manager Effects[J]. Financial Analysts Journal, July/August, 1996, 51-61.
  • 3Fama E, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory & Empirical Work[J]. Journal of Finance, May, 1970,25:383-417.
  • 4Kraus A,Litzenberger R. A State-Preference Model o[ Optical Financial Leverage[J]. Journal of Finance, September, 1973, 28:911-922.
  • 5Modigliani F, Miller M H, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment[J]. American Economic Review, June, 1958,48:267-297.
  • 6Modigliani F, Miller M H. Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction [J]. American Economic Review, June, 1963,53:344-433.
  • 7De Angelo H,Masulis R W. Optimal Capital Structure under Corporate and Personal Taxation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1980,8:3-29.
  • 8王晋斌,李振仲.内部职工持股计划与企业绩效——对西方和我国企业案例的考察[J].经济研究,1998,33(5):65-72. 被引量:63
  • 9J·弗雷镕·威斯通.兼并、重组与公司控制(中译本)[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1998.333-336.
  • 10朱民,刘琍琍,企业金融结构之谜——现代企业资产结构理论简析[A].戴汤敏,茅于轼.现代经济学前沿专题(第一集)[C],北京:商务印书馆,1989.256-294.

共引文献62

同被引文献15

引证文献2

二级引证文献1

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部