摘要
文章基于委托代理理论与控制权理论,以沪、深两市2007-2011年度1035家上市公司为研究对象,实证研究了金字塔结构、审计师声誉与股价信息含量的关系,期望验证在两权分离情况下,是否存在母公司对于子公司的信息披露控制问题。研究发现:金字塔结构下,两权分离度与上市公司股价信息含量呈现显著正相关关系,即随着母公司现金流权的减少、两权分离程度的加大,股价信息含量也得到相应的提高;具有良好声誉的审计师能够调节母子公司金字塔结构与上市子公司股价信息含量的相关关系,即强化上市子公司的股价信息含量。最后,针对以上结论提出相应政策建议。
Based on principal-agent theory and the right of control theory, with the empirical study of the relationship among the pyramid structure and 1035 listed companies of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2011, auditor reputation and stock price information conlenl, this paper expects to verify the existence of the parent company for the suhsidiary information disclosure controls under the condition of the separation of control right and cash flow right. The results show： under the pyramid structure, the separalion of control right anti cash flow right and listing of stock priee information content shows a significant positive correlation. Specifitally, wilh the reduction of the parent company＇s cash flow rights, the stock price information content has a corresponding increase; the auditor with good reputation can regulate the relationship between the pyramid structure and listed subsidimities＇ stock price information content, namely, to strengthen the stock price information content of listed suhsidiaries. And appropriate policy recommendations are put forward based on the ahove findings.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
2013年第7期96-101,共6页
East China Economic Management
基金
山东省社会科学规划项目"上市公司内部人交易行为研究"(10CJGJ22)
关键词
金字塔结构
两权分离度
股价信息含量
审计师声誉
pyramid slructure
separation of control right and cash flow right
stock price information content
auditor＇s reputation
