摘要
本文通过比较企业目标资本结构与实际资本结构加权平均资本成本测度资本结构调整效率，并利用2007～2011年我国沪深上市公司面板数据，实证检验了管理者自利行为对资本结构调整效率的影响。研究结果发现，由于管理者的自利倾向，企业调整其资本结构并非一定有效率，并且管理者自利程度与资本结构调整效率显著负相关。本文的贡献在于，把资本结构调整研究拓展到了调整效率领域，并为企业优化资本结构、完善融资治理机制提供了参考依据。
The dynamic adjustment of capital structure has become an important field of enterprise capital structure research at present. If the companies indeed constantly adjust their actual capital structure to reach the lev- el of target capital structure, there is not only the issue with adjustment speed, but also the adjustment path and its economic consequences. The related studies of current capital structure dynamic adjustment, however, just stay on the measurement and influence factor of adjustment speed. For the modern incorporated enterprises in which the property right is separate form the management right, the managers as agents have self-interested tendency on the choice and adjustment of capital structure. Their self-interested behavior may not lead to the maximization of share- holder wealth or enterprise value, that is, the capital structure adjustment is not necessarily efficient. How to scientifically measure adjustment efficiency of capital structure is the key content, which requires the combination of ＂financing＂ and ＂adjustment＂. It can use neither enterprise performance indicators, such as ROI or ROE, nor the actual capital structure indicators, but needs to compare the actual capital structure and the target cap- ital structure. The optimal capital structure can be considered as the debt level when the weighted average cost of capital （WACC） is the minimum and the enterprise value is the maximum. Therefore ,we can build models to fit the target capital structure and target debt maturity structure, and measure the adjustment efficiency of capital structure by comparing the WACC of enterprise actual capital structure to target capital structure. For the listed companies under the condition of market ＇economy transition in China, there is the lack of the ef- fective exterior bankrupt mechanism and the perfect corporate governance mechanism, in addition, the phenomenon of insider control is serious, and the independent director system don＇t perform their due supervision func- tion. Managers and shareholders are the dual control principal of enterprise, and the shareholders have ultimate con- trol over the enterprise, but the actual control power is owned by the managers. Some managerial self-interested be- haviors may exist in all the financial activities, including the inefficiency of capital structure adjustment. The motiva- tion and characteristic of managerial self-interested behaviors, based on the capital structure adjustment, are often associated with excessive investment, radical financing, less cash dividends, etc. Furthermore, the degree of manage- rial self-interest is higher, the motivation and characteristic are more obvious. Based on the panel data of 1213 Chinese companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2011, this paper makes an empirical study on the influence that managerial self-interested behavior to the capital structure ad- justment efficiency. The results show that the adjustment behavior of capital structure is not necessarily efficient be- cause of managerial self-interested tendency, and the degree of managerial self-interest shows a significant negative relation with the adjustment efficiency of capital structure. No matter the managerial self-interest is characterized by either excess management expenses or supernormal compensation of the directors, supervisors and executives, the empirical conclusions are consistent, and pass robustness test and endogenous test. In theory, the possible academic contribution of this paper perhaps is expanding the research field of capital structure adjustment from adjustment speed to adjustment path and adjustment efficiency. In practice, this paper can not only provide empirical evidence for the enterprises to choose financing method scientifically, optimize capital structure and improve financing mecha- nisms, but also provide reference for the government and relevant regulatory departments to formulate incentive con- straint policies and countermeasures of enterprise managers.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第7期143-153,共11页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
中国博士后科学基金项目"上市公司经营者股票期权定价模式及会计处理问题研究"(20110490330)
重庆市教委科技项目"基于系统动力学的国企高管薪酬激励研究"(KJ110718)
关键词
资本结构调整
调整效率
管理者自利
capital structure adjustment
adjustment efficiency
managerial self-interested behavior
