摘要
主要考察了作为内部治理机制的内部控制制度和外部治理机制的外部审计制度对上市公司控股股东利益侵占行为的制约作用。研究发现,内部控制质量高的公司有助于抑制控股股东的利益侵占行为,并且随着内部控制质量的提高,公司聘请高质量外部审计师的动机越大。研究还发现公司选择高质量外部审计师的概率越大,控股股东的侵占行为越小。说明无论是内部控制制度,还是外部审计监督制度,均具有一定的治理效应。
The paper examines whether internal control as an internal governance mechanism and external auditing as an external governance mechanism of firms can restrain the controlling shareholders＇ expropriation. Our research finds that high quality internal control contributes to restrain the controlling shareholders＇expropriate behavior, and with the improvement of quality of internal control, the higher likelihood for company to choose the auditors known for high quality. Our research also finds that the greater probability that companies choose the high quality auditing lead to the less control shareholders＇ expropriate behavior. It means internal control and external auditing have some governance effects.
出处
《经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第7期125-128,F0003,共5页
On Economic Problems
基金
吉林大学基本科研业务费项目(2011ZZ033)
关键词
内部控制
审计师选择
控股股东侵占
internal control
auditor choice
controlling shareholder expropriation
