摘要
针对"宅基地收回制度不健全,缺乏可操作性;宅基地无偿使用造成农户退出宅基地的动力丧失;居民主动退出宅基地缺乏必要的补偿机制和激励机制"问题,以国家"退宅还耕,退宅还林"政策为出发点,以陕西省出台的"举家进城"农户退宅补偿标准为基础,采用博弈论的方法,建立了政府和农民之间的博弈模型,对两个不同利益主体的决策和行为过程进行定量分析。结果表明:制定可行的宅基地退出补偿政策重点是从土地留置税是否使用、补偿标准是否符合当地农民经济情况、政策执行力度是否到位以及农民进城后收入是否能满足生活条件四个方面考虑,并提出了具体的政策建议。
Homestead recovery systems are not sound and lack of maneuverability and free use of home- stead causes farmers not to move from the homestead actively due to the lack of effective compensation and incentive mechanisms. Based on the national policy of ＂homesteads left for farming and foresting＂ and standard of compensation for ＂households moving from the homestead to cities＂ in Shaanxi province, establishes a game model between the government and farmers and makes the quantitative analysis of the process of their decision making conducts with the method of game theory. The results show that the focus of making feasible compensation policies for moving from homesteads is whether the tax lien from the land is for use, whether compensation standards are in compliance with local farmers＇financial situation, whether the have adequate income pects. policy can be fully implemented, and whether farmers who move to cities can to satisfy their needs. Specific suggestions are offered on account of the above aspects.
出处
《西安科技大学学报》
CAS
2013年第4期499-504,共6页
Journal of Xi’an University of Science and Technology
基金
省科技厅计划项目(2011TG-06)
关键词
宅基地
退出补偿机制
博弈论
homestead
exit compensation mechanism
game theory
