期刊文献+

利益驱逐:制衡抑或共谋?——我国上市银行股权特征与经营绩效的关系研究 被引量:1

Interest Pursuing:Restricting or Colluding?——Study on the Relationship between Ownership Characteristics and Business Performance in China's Listed Banks
下载PDF
导出
摘要 基于股权特征的视角,以2000-2011年中国13家上市银行的经验数据为样本,对大股东间利益驱逐的行为抉择与银行绩效的关系作了实证分析。研究表明:股权集中度对银行绩效具有显著的负作用;并且,随着股权集中度增大,对银行绩效的削弱能力就越强。股权制衡度与银行绩效间呈显著倒U型关系,即其他大股东对第一大股东的利益驱逐不仅具有制衡作用,而且存在"利益共谋"的可能性。因此,应规范大股东资本市场运作行为,提高银行信息披露的透明度,健全中小投资者"参政"网络渠道。 From the view of characteristics of ownership,it makes an empirical analysis of the relationship between behavior choice of interest pursuing among big shareholders and bank’s performance in China,by taking13 listed Banks in our country’s empirical data from 2000 to 2011 as samples.The study indicates that ownership concentration has significant negative effects on bank performance.By the way,as the degree of ownership concentration increases,the ability of weakening bank performance is stronger.The relationship between ownership restriction and bank performance is a significant inverted-U shaped,means that other big shareholders is not only a restriction to interest pursuing of the first big shareholder,but also there is the possibility of"collusion of interest"between them.Therefore,we should regulate the behavior of shareholders’ capital operation,improve the transparency of bank information disclosure,perfect the small and medium-sized investors’s network channels of "participating".
机构地区 安徽大学商学院
出处 《经济与管理》 CSSCI 2013年第7期51-58,共8页 Economy and Management
基金 国家社科基金重大项目(11&ZD011) 安徽大学学术创新研究扶持和强化项目
关键词 隧道挖掘 股权集中度 利益驱逐 行为抉择 共谋 Tunning Ownership concentration Interest pursuing Behavior choice Collusion
  • 相关文献

参考文献39

  • 1Stijn Classens,Simeon Djankov. Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 1999,27(3) : 498-513.
  • 2La Portal,Lopez-de-Silanes F,Shleifer A. Corporate ownership around the world [J].The Journal of Finance, 1999,54(2) :471-517.
  • 3Jae-Seung Baek,Jun-Koo Kang,Kyung Suh Park. Corporate governance and firm value:evidence from the Korean financial crisis [J].Journal of Financial Eco- nomics, 2004,71 ( 2 ) : 265-313.
  • 4Kirchmaier T,Grant J. Corporate ownership structure and performance in Europe [J] view, 2005,2( 3 ) : 231-245.
  • 5Joseph P.H. Fan,T.J.Wong. European Management Re- Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2002,33 (3) : 401-425.
  • 6Ram Mudambi,Carmela Nicosia. Ownership structure and firm performance:evidence from the UK financial ser- vices industry [J]. Applied Financial Economics,1998,8 (2): 175-180.
  • 7Qiao Liu,Zhou(Joe) Lu. Corporate governance and earn- ings management in the Chinese listed companies:A tunneling perspective [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2007,13(5) :881-906.
  • 8John Lessing. The Checks and Balances of Good Corpo- rate Governance [J]. Corporate Governance E Journal, 2009,11 (27) : 1-7.
  • 9Bennedsen M,Wolfenzon D. The balance of power in closely held corporations [J]. Journal of financial eco- nomics, 2000,58 ( 1 ) : 113-139.
  • 10Maury B,Pajuste A. Multiple large shareholders and firm value[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2005,29 (7) : 1813-1834.

二级参考文献295

共引文献3392

同被引文献11

引证文献1

二级引证文献20

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部