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管理层激励、资本结构与上市公司价值创造 被引量:25

MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE,CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND VALUE CREATION OF LISTED COMPANY
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摘要 本文基于带有交叉乘积项的线性分位数回归模型,一方面,通过回归系数显著性检验、同质性检验与对称性检验,揭示各因素对公司价值创造影响方式的异质性;另一方面,通过条件密度预测方法,细致地刻画各因素的变动对价值创造整个条件密度的影响。实证结果表明:实施激励措施可以显著提高上市公司价值创造,但不同的激励方式对公司价值创造能力的影响并无显著差异;无论是薪酬激励还是股权激励,都会导致公司价值创造出现两极分化的现象,这为制订合理的政策措施来提升公司价值创造提供了决策依据。 Based on the linear quantile regression model with interaction term, this paper investigates two stylized facts in company management. The first one is to investigate the heterogeneous way of the im- pact on company value creation by three test. The other is to describe how the conditional density of com- pany value creation is affected by those factors through conditional density forecast. The results show that: the implementation of incentive measures could improve the company value creation ability drastical- ly, but different incentive methods have similar influence on the company value creation ability. Both salary incentive and equity incentive can lead to the polarize phenomenon in company value creation, which plays an important role in improving company value creation.
出处 《经济理论与经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第7期70-80,共11页 Economic Theory and Business Management
基金 安徽省社科规划项目(AHSK09-10D10) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2011HGRJ0006) 国家自然科学基金项目(71172190)
关键词 资本结构 股权激励 薪酬激励 价值创造 分位数回归 capital structure equity incentive salary incentive value creation quantile regression
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