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高速公路BOT项目调节基金决策机制研究 被引量:9

Investigating the Decision of Adjustment Fund in Highway BOT Projects
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摘要 调节基金是保证BOT项目稳定运营的有效手段,该基金上下限的设置关系到项目公司与政府的核心利益。在BOT项目合同谈判中,按照合理的规则制定出调节基金的上下限十分重要。本文将从高速公路BOT项目社会效益及项目投资回报等角度出发,建立模型并通过算例验证,提出公路BOT项目中调节基金上下限设置的决策机制,以期为政府在相关BOT项目合同谈判中提供理论参考。 BOT projdcts generally have such features as large period of concession term, highway BOT projects have risks environment. quantities, long payback period, and high project risk. In the long because they are faced with complicated and uncertain economic A regulation fund system has been designed in order to avert market risks and ensure the stable operation of highway nOT projects. The establishment of the independent fund account can absorb fund, improve project stability when there is excessive annual earnings, and supply fund when the annual earning is too low. A project's market risk can be effectively circumvented through the fund regulation system. However, its upper and lower limits can affect the core interests of the project executing company and government. In the highway nOT project, the project company aims at making investment income on the basis of the design of fund regulation system. It is expected that the upper and lower limits could be maximized. In this way, the company could receive much more funds from fund companies, and at the same time reduce the income turned over to the fund company. The government expects to regulate the upper and lower limits to minimize range in order to increase the attraction of fund to the project, and cut the investment from funds. In the process of negotiating contracts for highway nOT project, unreasonable upper and lower limits of regulation fund may cause the profit loss of all project parties, and even lead to projects failure. From the perspective of sustainable development, low upper and lower regulation fund limits could restrain unreasonable growth of investment returns for project company, and increase social benefits of individual projects in the short term. However, if the level of upper and lower regulation fundlimits is too low in the long run, it would result in a reduction of investment returns for the whole industry and the-enthusiasm of investors, which in return has an impact on long-term sustained growth of social benefits as well as the sustainable development of infrastructure. High upper and low regulation fund limits could increase the profit acquisition for project executing company, but it would cause a loss to social benefits and even affect the civil recognition of BOT project as well as the development of infrastructure. So it is very important to establish a balance between government and company by regulating the upper and lower limits in a reasonable range. To achieve sustainable growth of social benefit and protect project investors' reasonable profits, the paper discusses the establishment of the lower limit of regulation fund in accordance with investor's acceptable minimum reasonable profits. The article also introduces the "Social Average Consumer Surplus" as the basis of upper limits of regulation fund. By comparing the average income of project's NPV with the upper and lower limits of regulation fund, and having the mathematical model established, we select the higher one and add it to the lower one. Moreover, the system is verified through an example, and the feasibility and reasonability are analyzed. Regulation fund not only raises project stability, but also makes sure that investors make reasonable profits in BOT Systems. At the same time, it can prevent franchises from making monopolistic profit. Finally, a win-win situation between investors' interest and social benefit could be realized.
作者 赵立力 游琦
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第3期81-86,共6页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(SWJTU09CX081)
关键词 BOT 调节基金 投资收益 社会效益 BOT regulation fund investment income social benefits
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