摘要
本文在代理理论和公司治理理论的框架下,分析了公司价值、治理水平与股权激励停止的关系,并以2006-2011年公告实施股权激励和停止股权激励的上市公司为样本,实证检验了公司价值和治理水平与股权激励实施结果的协同效应。研究结果表明:首先,股权激励停止受到上市公司价值和治理水平的显著影响,存在选择性偏见;其次,股权激励的政策变迁显著改善了盈利能力水平低的公司和市场价值高的公司的激励结果,使他们与政策变迁前相比更有可能完成股权激励;此外,上市公司公告停止股权激励没有显著的市场反应,并且与完成股权激励的公司相比,其公告实施股权激励的市场反应更弱。
Based on agency theory and corporate governance theory, we analyze the relationship between corporate value, governance quality and withdrawal of managerial equity incentives. Using the data of equity incentives exe- cution and withdrawal declared from 2006 to 2011 in China listed firms, we test our hypotheses by investigating the synergy effect on corporate value, governance quality and incentives withdrawal. The study indicates： firstly, we find corporate value and governance quality have a significant impact on the withdrawal of managerial equity incen- tives, which discloses the selective bias; secondly, institutional change of equity incentives facilitate better finns with low earnings and high values to accomplish their incentives ; additionally, we do not find the significant market response to the declaration of incentives withdrawal in contrast to that to the declaration of execution, meanwhile, e- vent study also shows the weaker market response to the execution declaration of withdrawn firms compared to the response of those firms executed successfully.
出处
《华南理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
2013年第4期12-22,共11页
Journal of South China University of Technology(Social Science Edition)
关键词
股权激励
公司价值
治理水平
激励停止
政策变迁
equity Incentives
corporate value
governance quality
incentives withdrawal
institutional change
