摘要
针对多级供应链质量事件,本文构建由消费者、零售商和供应商组成的三阶动态博弈模型,通过引入消费者投诉,触发零售商对供应商不合格产品或服务进行强惩罚,使供应商形成违约惩罚预期,有效改进多级委托-代理环境的产品或服务质量。论文求解出惩罚预期下消费者的最优投诉比例、零售商的最优违约惩罚以及供应商的最优质量投入。建模和算例仿真结果显示:仅是惩罚预期,而无需实际实施惩罚,就能有效约束供应商的投机行为,减少质量事件的发生,但是预期机制的成功实现依赖于市场整体环境改善,如投诉成本降低以及社会对契约的尊重等。
For the multi - level supply chain quality events, this paper constructs a three - stage dynamic game model,in which the consumer＇ s complaint triggers the retailer＇ s punishment to the manufacturer. This paper solves the optimal complaint rate of consumer, the punishment rate of retailer and the manufacturer＇ s favorite product quality level. The outcomes of this model indicate that declaring the highly expectation punishment without actually imposing penalty can effectively constrain the suppliers＇ speculative behavior and reduce the supply chain quality event. However, the complete success of the expectation mechanism depends on the improvement of market environment, such as the cost reduction of complaints and the social respectation to contracts.
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第5期5-12,30,共9页
Economic Review
基金
广东省哲学社会科学"十二五"规划项目"大宗战略性资源贸易定价权博弈与供应链协调机制设计"(项目编号:GD11YGL14)
广东高校优秀青年创新人才培育计划育苗工程项目(粤财教[2011]473号)
华南师范大学青年教师科研培育基金(华师[2011]138号)的资助
关键词
惩罚
预期
质量
机制设计
Punishment
Expectation
Quality
Mechanism Design
