宏观环境、产权性质与企业非效率投资被引量：30

Macro Environment,Nature of Property Right and Inefficient Investments

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摘要利用我国上市企业2007-2011年的全样本数据,就宏观环境、产权性质对企业非效率投资的影响进行实证检验。研究表明,总体上投资过度和投资不足并存于上市企业,投资过度的企业数量多于投资不足,而企业投资不足的程度甚于投资过度;企业的投资水平与宏观环境高度正相关,宏观环境向好时投资水平更高;在引入现金流与产权性质的交互项并划分不同宏观环境样本后,结果显示国有企业投资过度较为严重;民营企业投资不足较为严重,并且宏观环境趋紧会进一步加剧民营企业这一产权性质本身所导致的投资不足。本研究可为政府治理和企业投资提供有益的依据和实践指导。 Based on full sample data spanning from the year 2007 to 2011 of Chinese listed enterprises, this study empirically analyzes and examines the impact of nature of property right and macro environment set on inefficient investments. It shows that generally, both over- and under-investments exist; the number of over-investment enterprises is more than under-investment while the degree of under-investment enterprises is worse than over-investment; investment amount is positively related to macro environment, investment amount grows higher when macro environment is sound; after interactive term of cash flow and nature of property right is included in the model and the samples are divided according to different macro environment, we find that State-owned enterprises tend to suffer from over-investment; non-state-owned enterprises tend to suffer from under-investment and this problem gets worse when macro environment is tough. This study will provide a beneficial basis and practice guideline both for government and enterprise investment.

作者佟爱琴马星洁

机构地区同济大学经济与管理学院

出处《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第9期12-20,共9页 Management Review

基金国家自然科学基金项目(70602026)

关键词宏观环境产权性质投资过度投资不足 macro environment, nature of property right, over-investment, under-investment

分类号 F271 [经济管理—企业管理] F275 [经济管理—企业管理] F224 [经济管理—国民经济]

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