摘要
采用中国证券市场1992～2010年沪深两市上市公司的全样本数据及各地区市场及历史数据，考察企业各类违规行为的分布特点、变化趋势及其基于中国特殊情形的原因和影响机制。研究结果表明：终极控制人所有权一控制权的分离将明显弱化终极控制人所有权比例对上市公司经营层违规概率的显著负向影响．至少在终极控制人所有权比例大于10％的情况下，终极控制人控制权一所有权分离度与企业股东违规概率显著正相关，而终极控制人所有权比例的作用则并不显著；终极控制性股东的“国有”或“非国有”的性质并不重要，而竞争性的市场机制是企业治理机制产生作用的前提；社会普遍的契约意识是影响企业治理机制发挥作用的重要因素。
By the data of listed companies in China from 1992 to 2010 as well as regional and historical data, We investigate the distribution characteristics, change trend and the reasons and influential mechanism based on China＇s specific situation. The state shows that the separation of control rights and cash flow rights could weaken the significant negative impact of ultimate controlling shareholder on irregularities of the company executives. At least in the case that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholder are above 10%, the degree of the separation has noticeably positive correlations with the probability of irregularities of shareholder, but not the percentage of cash flow rights itself. The nature of ＂state＂ or ＂non-state＂ of the ultimate controlling shareholder is not important. The competitive market mechanism is the premise of the company governance mechanism that functions. The general contract consciousness in the society is the important factor that affects the function of company governance mechanism.
出处
《改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第10期142-151,共10页
Reform
基金
四川省哲学社会科学规划项目“‘辩白式’信息披露、市场反应与公司治理机制--来自中国证券市场澄清公告的准自然实验的行为研究”(批准号:SC12B019)
关键词
上市公司违规行为
上市公司治理机制
证券市场监管
irregularities of listed companies, corporate governance mechanism, securities market supervision
