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中国碳排放权交易市场的构建及宏观调控研究 被引量:12

The Establishment of China's National Carbon Market and Its Macro-control Strategy
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摘要 空间灵活性决定了碳排放权交易市场的流动性水平和定价机制效率,但目前我国采取的是"先试点后推广"的自下而上的碳交易市场构建模式,这会导致市场的碎片化问题。如何将多个并行运转的区域碳交易市场进行连接,构建全国性市场,是中央计划者必须要提前考量的问题。市场连接的目标是建立统一的价格信号,这需要设计一系列宏观调控工具,在避免系统失灵的同时促进全国统一市场的形成。本文从碳交易市场的定价机制出发,研究了惩罚水平与排放权短缺的概率预期对价格信号的决定性因素,同时讨论了最新的价格管理机制——价格上下限,安全阀机制,动态分配等,并以此为基础提出了一种渐进式宏观调控策略。该策略通过运用一系列宏观调控工具(惩罚水平以及动态分配、安全阀机制、产业政策、边界措施等),避免系统性失灵,同时不断评估各个系统的运行参数,寻找最优的市场连接机会,促进子系统之间的融合,逐步形成统一的价格信号,为中国碳交易市场的顶层设计开辟了新的研究思路。 Space flexibility determines the fluidity level and pricing efficiency of carbon trading market.Currently,China is using the bottom-up approach to build its' carbon market by promoting seven pilot trading systems,which would lead to a fragmented carbon market in the future.The central planner must speculate the issue on how to link different local markets together and transform them into one single national market.The target of market linkage is to forge a single pricing signal with the use of a series of macro-control instruments which can also deal with market failure.This paper researches the key drivers of carbon price that are penalty level and the expectation to shortage of allowances based on a spot pricing model whilst discussing the pricing management mechanisms.Following these research,the paper proposes a new macro-control strategy to help the central planner to find the best opportunities to link markets and accelerate the shaping of single carbon pricing based on a couple of instruments including penalty level,dynamic reserve,safety valve,industrial policies and boundary measures.
作者 陈波
出处 《中国人口·资源与环境》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第11期7-13,共7页 China Population,Resources and Environment
基金 国家社科基金项目"支撑我国低碳经济发展的碳金融机制研究"(编号:10CJY076) 国家科技支撑计划课题"我国绿色低碳发展的关键支撑政策与技术研究"(编号:2012BAC20B08) 财政部中国清洁发展机制基金赠款项目"我国应对气候变化融资:战略 机制和政策体系研究"(编号:2012064) 中央财经大学科研创新团队支持计划及中国财政发展协同创新中心支持
关键词 碳交易市场 连接 价格信号 宏观调控 national carbon market linkage pricing signal macro-control
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参考文献15

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