摘要
心灵延展论证最终要解决的是心理属性的实现,尤其是实现的方法与地点。克拉克与查默斯采用"从推理发展为最佳解释"的策略解决这个问题。对于他们来说,积极的外在主义主要解决的是解释问题,而非形而上学问题,但他们又无法克服因果-构成谬误。罗伯特·威尔逊认为谬误的根源在于,他们混淆了实现问题与构成问题,不恰当地从心理属性的"构成性"转向"归属权",仅从宽实现这个前提无法确定心灵延展,必需结合系统的实在。我认为,威尔逊虽然强调归属权问题的重要性,但却没有明确这个问题的意义。通过阐释这个问题,我提出了心理属性归属权的标准,并发现克拉克与查默斯的论证满足这个标准,威尔逊对实现的构成方式的处理其实并不恰当。
Mind extension arguments eventually deal with the realization of mental properties： specifically, how and where these properties are realized （possessed）. Clark and Chalmers appeal to the superior explanatory power of their explanations may be making an abductive move, viz., inference to the best explanation. They claimed that externalisms are first and foremost theses about explanation--not metaphysics. Wilson, while clearly not moved by Causal/Constitutive Error concerns, suggests that C＆C confuse issues of realization and constitution with issues of ownership of properties. Resist- ing the conflation of issues concerning ownership with those concerning realization, Wilson claims, will make it clear that there is no motivation to at- tribute mental properties to wide bearers. To articulate Wilson＇s assertion I need to review his account of realization and see exactly why he thinks it gives us grounds to resist attributing mental properties to wide subjects. I think that Wilson does not provide an account of what it is for a mental property to belong to an entity. Instead, Wilson only describes what characteristics an entity must demonstrate in order to have mentai properties at- tributed to it--this was the lesson of his discussion about system realism. However, determining whether or not minds actually extend requires that I have an account of what it is for an entity to own a mental property.
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第1期14-19,共6页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
关键词
延展认知
延展心灵
积极的外在主义
实现
extended cognition
extended mind
activity extemalism
realization
