期刊文献+

当代伦理学关于运气问题的争论与辩护 被引量:3

Arguments and Defenses about Moral Luck in Contemporary Ethics
原文传递
导出
摘要 "运气有多重要"一直是引起伦理学诸多争议的重要话题。围绕应该如何理解运气的伦理意义与道德权重,伦理学史上存在宏观与微观两种讨论方式。20世纪70年代以来,在微观层面上探讨运气与能动性、后果之间关系,以及三者对于道德评价的重要性,已成为当代伦理学的一个争论热点。以威廉姆斯为代表的运气论者主张,应承认运气的真实性和扰动作用,反对将道德评价局限于纯粹的能动性中。对此,后果论、温和的动机论与激进的动机论三种反对立场从各自角度出发,提出了相对应的反驳意见。它们的根本分歧在于,面对"能动性一运气一后果"的道德结构,四者把其中的不同因素理解为最重要的(或唯一重要的)评价根据。但是,反对者为了保持理论的融贯性,忽视甚至阉割了真实的道德经验。与之相比,引入并承认运气的重要性,是对人类有限性与世界复杂性的确认,促使我们重新思考道德知识与道德生活的本质。 Abstract: "What dose luck matter" has been always an important issue debates in ethics. As to how to understand the ethical meanings and moral weight of luck, there are two ways in the history of ethics, macroscopic and microscopic. Since 1970's, the discussions about the relationship between luck and agency or consequence and the relevance of these three factors for moral appraisals, have been one of the focuses in contemporary ethics. Those who accept the conception of luck in ethics, such Bernard Williams, agree that we should recognize the reality and functions of luck and oppose to limit moral appraisals within the scope of pure agency. However, there are three oppositions of consequentialism, moderate motivism and radical motivism, showing their corresponding objections. The essential disagreement is that the four positions, with the moral structure of "agency-- luck--consequece", separately take different factors as the most (or even only ) important ground for appraisals. But the oppositions actually ignore and dismiss the real moral experience just for theoretical consistency. Compared with them, the position of introducing luck and recognizing its importance should be considered as confirming the limitation of human beings and the complexity of our world, and helping us to reflect essences of moral knowledge and moral life.
作者 李义天
出处 《学术月刊》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第1期70-79,共10页 Academic Monthly
基金 2010年国家社科基金项目"当代美德伦理学及其心理基础研究"(10CZX043)的阶段性成果
关键词 运气 能动性 后果 道德评价 Key Word: luck, agency, consequence, moral appraisal
  • 相关文献

参考文献30

  • 1[美]玛莎·纳斯鲍姆:《善的脆弱性》,徐向东,陆萌译,南京:译林出版社,2007年,第623页.
  • 2[古希腊]亚里士多德.《尼各马可伦理学》,北京,商务印书馆,2003年版,第38-39页.
  • 3李义天.《美德伦理学与道德多样性》,北京:中央编译出版社,2012年,第150-153页.
  • 4Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.2.
  • 5Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits oatPhilosophy, Fontana Press, 1985, p.7.
  • 6李义天.从道德运气到伦理运气——美德伦理视野中的运气问题研究[J].伦理学研究,2012(5):122-128. 被引量:7
  • 7Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.28.
  • 8G. Watson, Free Will, Oxford University Press, 1982, p.9.
  • 9D. Pereboom, Living Without Free Will, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.41-54.
  • 10Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, p.21,p.30.

二级参考文献21

  • 1Bernard Williams. Moral Luck[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1981.
  • 2内格尔;万以.人的问题[M]上海:上海译文出版社,2004.
  • 3Daniel Statman. Moral Luck[M].State University of New York Press,1993.
  • 4斯密;蒋自强.道德情操论[M]北京:商务印书馆,1997.
  • 5苗力田.亚里士多德选集@伦理学卷[M]北京:中国人民大学出版社,1999.
  • 6William Rottschaefer. The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2008.
  • 7色诺芬;吴永泉.回忆苏格拉底[M]北京:商务印书馆,1984.
  • 8曼斯菲尔德;刘玮.男性气概[M]南京:译林出版社,2009.
  • 9康德;苗力田.道德形而上学原理[M]上海:上海人民出版社,2005.
  • 10Andrew Latus,Moral Luck. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy[OL].http://www.iep.utm.edu/moralluc/,.

共引文献32

同被引文献16

  • 1李义天.从道德运气到伦理运气——美德伦理视野中的运气问题研究[J].伦理学研究,2012(5):122-128. 被引量:7
  • 2伯纳德·威廉斯.《道德运气》,上海,上海译文出版社,2007.
  • 3亚里士多德.《尼各马可伦理学》.第304,305页.廖申白译.北京,商务印书馆,2003.
  • 4Thomas Nagel.Moral Questions,Cambridge University Press,1979.
  • 5纳斯鲍姆:《善的脆弱性》,徐向东,陆萌译,北京:译林出版社2007年版.
  • 6Thomson,Judith Jausis,“Morality and Bad Luck”,Metaphilosophy,Jul1989,Vol.20,Issue3/4.
  • 7Bernard Williams.Moral Luck,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1981.
  • 8徐向东:《自我,他人与道德-道德哲学导论》(下),北京:商务印书馆2007年版.
  • 9Bernard Williams.Making Sense of Humanity,Cambridge Univetsity Press,1995.
  • 10吴翠丽.当代西方运气均等主义的理论演进及其问题[J].伦理学研究,2009(6):33-37. 被引量:2

引证文献3

二级引证文献2

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部