摘要
文章利用我国创业板公司数据,研究了分析师关注对公司研发决策的影响。研究结果表明:(1)分析师关注给经理层带来了过大的压力,导致经理层为了提高短期业绩而减少研发投入;(2)为了缓解这种负面影响,既可以利用控股股东来减少经理层的短期行为,也可以增加经理层持股水平,但控股股东的治理作用依赖于其对研发项目的熟悉程度;(3)分析师关注也可能减少信息不对称,从而对公司研发投入产生正面影响。
Using the data of growth enterprise market in China,this paper studies the effect of analyst coverage on corporate R&D decision-making.It reaches the results as follows:firstly,analyst coverage brings too much pressure to executive managers and as a result,these mangers are likely to cut R&D investment to improve short-term performance;secondly,the role of controlling shareholders in the reduction in managerial short-term behavior and the increase in managerial ownership can help to weaken this negative effect;however,the governance role of controlling shareholders depends on their familiarity with corporate R&D projects;thirdly,analyst coverage may reduce information asymmetry,resulting in a positive effect on corporate R&D investment.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期108-119,共12页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71371118)
关键词
分析师关注
研发投入
代理冲突
控股股东
经理层持股
信息不对称
analyst coverage
R&D investment
agency conflict
controlling shareholder
man-agerial ownership
information asymmetry
