摘要
考虑电子商务环境下网络销售潜在的波动性和物流服务特点,引入额外供应成本分担因素,对在线零售商和物流提供商的配送能力建立博弈模型,分别讨论双方在非合作和合作情形下的均衡解及其与相关参数的关系。分析论证在完全独立决策下,在线零售商不会分担物流提供商的额外供应成本;在Stackelberg博弈下,在线零售商的收益要大于完全独立决策的情形,而物流提供商的收益需要满足一定的条件才有改进;在合作博弈下,供应链的整体收益最大,并且存在具有Pareto改进的均衡解。
Considering the volatility of network selling and the characteristics of logistic service in E - commerce environments, a game model about distribution capability consisted of one online retailer and one logistics provider was established by introducing additional cost sharing factor. The paper discussed the equilibrium solution and its relationship with related parameters in the case of non - cooperation and cooperation respectively. The analysis and argumentation showed that the online retailer would not share the additional cost of logistics providers in a completely independent decision - making. Then, in the Stackelberg game, the on- line retailer earned more, but the profit of logistics provider was improved based on certain conditions. Furthermore, the best o- verall revenue of supply chain was achieved in the cooperative game, and the equilibrium with Pareto improvement solution was proved by regulating the extra cost sharing proportion.
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第3期140-146,共7页
Science Research Management
基金
国家自然科学基金-国际(地区)合作交流项目:电子商务环境下的快速物流系统研究(71110107024)
起止时间:2012.01-2016.12
国家自然科学基金项目:具有网络效应特征的新产品协同扩散研究(71171182)
起止时间:2012.01-2015.12
