摘要
从博弈论的视角,构建2个强势制造商和2个排他性供应商组成的链与链价格竞争模型,研究竞争供应链基于利润分享合同的纵向研发联盟选择策略。研究表明,当市场竞争强度较低,或者市场竞争强度相对适中且研发效率较高时,形成纵向联盟结构链与链竞争均衡,该均衡为实现制造商和供应商利润Pareto改进的占优均衡。数值分析表明,随着竞争强度的减弱或者研发效率的提高,联盟的有效利润分享比例范围逐渐缩减。
From the perspective of game theory, this paper constructs two competing supply chains, and each supply chain consists of one leader-manufacturer and one exclusive supplier. We ex- plore the selection strategy for vertical R＆D alliance with profit sharing contract. The results suggest that if market competition intensity is relatively low, or market competition intensity is moderate as well as RInD is efficient, vertical R＆D alliance chain-to-chain competition will be the dominant equi- librium, which can make suppliers and manufacturers be better off. Numerical analysis shows that the feasible range of profit sharing for alliances shrinks as the competition intensity decreases or the R＆D efficiency increases.
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第4期599-604,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(70932005)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772070)
关键词
纵向研发联盟
成本削减
链与链竞争
利润分享
vertical R＆D alliance
cost reduction
chain to chain competition
profit sharing
