摘要
在党和政府的重要文件中,政府审计一直被作为权力制约和监督机制。以信息经济学为基础,按委托代理关系、机会主义、治理机制和政府审计的逻辑顺序,分析政府审计为什么能够以及如何对公共权力进行制约和监督。公共权力及其运行离不开委托代理关系,由于信息不对称、激励不相容和环境不确定,公共权力机会主义必然出现。在应对公共权力机会主义的治理机制中,事前审计是制衡机制,跟踪审计是监督机制,事后审计是问责信息保障机制,审计基本功能是鉴证公共权力机构在责任履行、资源使用、信息报告、最大善意和运行机制等方面是否存在机会主义行为。
In the important documents of the Party and the government, the government audit has been as a power restriction and supervision mechanism. In this paper, based on the information economics, following the logical sequence of principal-a- gent relationship, opportunism, governance mechanism and government audit, the author analyzes government audit why can and how to supervise and restrict public powers. Without the principal-agent relationship, public power can not be put into op- eration, due to information asymmetry, incentive incompatible and environmental uncertainty, public power opportunism is in- evitable. In the structure of governance mechanism to control public power opportunism, the basic attribute of government au- dit is public power accountability information guarantee mechanism, its basic function is to verify the existence of opportunistic behavior in duty, resource use, information report, the utmost good faith and operating mechanism.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第1期11-18,共8页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
江苏高校优势学科建设工程(PAPD)
关键词
公共权力
机会主义
治理机制
问责制
政府审计
国家审计
审计监督
经济责任审计
public powers
opportunism
governance mechanism
accountability
government audit
state audit
audit su- pervision
economic responsibility audit
