摘要
本文基于双重委托代理框架,构建了公司治理主体的权力博弈对股权激励的影响路径分析模型,并运用2007-2012年中国民营中小上市公司面板数据进行实证分析。研究发现:作为民营中小上市公司的核心治理主体,经营层与终极控制人的权力博弈对股权激励强度及其双重效应均具有显著影响。具体而言,经营层权力对股权激励强度具有显著的正向影响,终极控制人权力则对其产生负向影响,两者在对股权激励强度作用的过程中存在冲突,终极控制人权力对股权激励强度的负向作用更为强烈;股权激励对第一类代理成本具有抑制效应,而在经营层权力与终极控制权力的双重调节效应下,这种抑制效应更为凸显;股权激励对第二类代理成本的作用并不显著,但这种作用过程同样受到来自两类权力双重调节效应的显著影响。
Based on double - layer principle - agent framework, we construct a model to analyze the impact path of power game of governance bodies on equity incentive, and do the empirical research by using the panel data of private small and medium -sized listed companies during 2007 -2012 in China. The results show that： the power game has significant impacts both on equity incentive intensity and its double effects. Specifically, managerial power and ultimate controller power have positive and negative influence on the equity incentive intensity respectively; there is a conflict in the process, the ultimate controller power＇ s negative impact shows more obviously; the negative effect of equity incentive on agency cost I becomes more significant in the dual moderating effect of the two powers; the impact of equity incentive on agency cost II is not significant, but this process is also moderated by the two powers simultaneously.
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第3期64-74,共11页
Economic Review
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“高管激励契约整合与中小上市公司成长:基于技术创新动态能力的中介效应”(项目编号:71302089)
国家自然科学基金面上项目“上市公司高管激励配置与协同--基于多层次情境因素的研究”(项目编号:71272120)
山东省优秀中青年科学家科研奖励基金(项目编号:BS2013SF006)
山东大学自主创新青年团队项目(项目编号:IFYT12059)的资助
关键词
股权激励
权力博弈
双重代理成本
民营中小上市公司
Equity Incentive
Power Game
Double Agency Costs
Private Small and Medium -sized Listed Companies
