摘要
文章在考虑养老机构竞争受地理位置影响的基础上,建立了公办养老机构与民办养老机构的博弈模型。结果表明:老年人分布结构变化对公办及民办养老机构的利润带来相反方向的变化,且不完全市场覆盖下老年人分布结构变化对养老机构的影响程度更大;当政府对养老机构投入差距较小时,民办养老机构选址可以离公办养老机构更近,当投入差距较大时,选址应适当离公办养老机构更远;老年人对距离的厌恶程度越大,完全市场覆盖情形下养老机构的利润有所增加,不完全市场覆盖情形下的养老机构利润有所减少;养老机构周边老年人密度越大,服务成本系数差距及距离厌恶系数对其利润的影响越大。
Based on impacts of location on the competitiveness among pension institutions, the paper builds the game model of public pension institutions and private pension institutions. The results show that： lhe change of the elderly distribution structure will bring opposite effects to the profits of both public and private pension institutions, and the greater effects under the incomplete market coverage; when the public funds from the government are smaller, the location of private pension insti tutions should be closer to public pension institutions, when the public funds from the government are larger, the location of private pension institutions should keep away from public pension institutions; the aversion of elderly to distance is more, the profits of pension institutions will increase under the full market coverage, while the profits of pension institutions will decrease under the incomplete market coverage; the greater the elderly density around pension institutions, the greater the gap of ser vice cost coefficient and the distance aversion coefficient to the profits.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
2014年第5期31-36,共6页
East China Economic Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71261006)
江西省社会科学规划项目(11GL05)
关键词
完全市场覆盖
不完全市场覆盖
公办养老机构
民办养老机构
地理位置
full market coverage
incomplete market coverage
public pension institution
private pension institution
location
