摘要
艾塞亚·伯林的《两种自由的概念》是近代自由主义的经典之作,并一再被人征引。无论是经验主义者还是理性主义者都自觉或不自觉地从持有的一元论域境中突破出来,并对二者由此引伸出来的对"积极自由"的热情、执着追求可能或已经在实践带来的危险做出了学理的解析,进而积极赞扬一种不同于"积极自由"的、多元价值域境下的"消极自由"。但在伯林对于"消极自由"的推崇,并没有向人们表明自由——无论是消极的,还是积极的——到底通过什么方式、在什么社会制度下可以达到或者通过什么样的原则、体系设计可以实现。"消极自由"对于"积极自由"的设限本身也就成为一种虚幻的影像,伯林更多的是提出了问题还不是解决了问题。
Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” is a classic of modern liberalism, and his concept of freedom broke out from either empiricists or rationalists who are consciously or unconsciously holding monism. Berlin inferred that enthusiasm and the pursuit of“positive freedom” may have been brought dangers in practice. He actively praised a“negative freedom”, which is unlike“positive freedom”, under the multi-value background. The value of Berlin’s“negative freedom”, however, doesn’t show that liberty could be achieved by what principles or systems in some way, in some social systems. The restriction of “negative freedom” to “positive freedom” itself has become an illusory image. Thus, the work of Berlin had raised issues, instead of having resolved the problem.
出处
《中南大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2014年第1期150-154,共5页
Journal of Central South University：Social Sciences
