摘要
提前期压缩是企业在激烈竞争环境中赢得与保持竞争优势的一种有效方式。本文制定了一个交易信用(即零售商向供应商提前付款)契约,讨论了可控提前期下非一体化供应链中的库存协作问题,得到了供应商与零售商的最优策略组合。研究表明,当提前期压缩成本系数足够小时,供应商采用所设计的交易信用契约,能够在满足零售商个体理性约束的前提下,赚取可观的成本节约金额,而且比纯粹延期付款协调零售商订货行为时所获得的成本节约更多;并且通过对该成本节约的合理分配,实现了供应商与零售商成本境况的帕累托改进乃至整条供应链的协调。最后的数值分析考察了安全库存系数、提前期需求波动、或者供应商的资金投资收益率对供应链最优策略与成本节约幅度的影响。
In an increasingly competitive market,enterprises usually need to make a quick response to customers＇ demand in order to win and maintain competitive advantages.Time-based Competition （TBC） has been the popular competitive mode for firms that manufacture products or provide services.As Tersine points out,lead-time reduction within the supply-production-distribution chain is the mechanism for time-based competition.Based on a two-level supply chain which is composed of a single supplier and a single retailer,this paper firstly considers that the supplier can exert control or dominance over lead-time,and treats lead-time as the supplier＇s decision variable.Secondly,we introduce trade credit,referred to as prepayment or payment in advance,as a coordination mechanism,which can often be observed in many firms＇ business activities.Thirdly,we investigate the supplier and retailer＇s decision-making processes with trade-credit contract designed in the non-integrated supply chain,and obtain supply chain members＇ optimal joint strategies including ordering quantities,the expediting factor of lead-time,and prepaid credit period.Finally,a numerical experiment is conducted to verify the proposed model and relevant results.In summary,we find that：（i） The retailer＇s optimal ordering quantities increase when the expediting factor of lead-time drops.Thus,the supplier could reasonably induce the retailer＇s ordering behavior by controlling lead-time; （ii） If the value of cost coefficient of lead-time reduction is small enough,as compared with the initial situation,the supplier is able to earn very considerable cost savings through implementing trade-credit （i.e.prepayment） contract,which are even more than those in the scenario where the supplier allows the retailer a permissible delay in payment.At the same time,the retailer ‘ s initial annual average cost doesn＇t rise at all.Therefore,the retailer＇s individual rationality constraint is still satisfied.（iii） The supplier＇s optimal length of lead-time will be significantly shortened as the value of safety stock factor or the variance of lead-time demand increases.（iv） With the enhancement of the supplier＇s rate of return on capital investment,the retailer＇s optimal order quantities will decrease,the optimal length of lead-time will become shorter,the optimal prepaid period will be longer,and the whole supply chain will earn more cost savings; （v） Depending upon their relative risk-aversion degree,the supplier and the retailer can equally allocate the earned cost savings through the Nash bargaining model,realize the Pareto improvement of their cost status,and ultimately achieve the coordination of the entire supply chain.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期93-99,共7页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072063
71001063)
上海哲学社会科学规划课题资助项目(2012BGL011)
关键词
可控提前期
交易信用
提前付款
订货策略
供应链协调
supply chain coordination
controllable lead time
trade credit
prepayment
ordering policy
