摘要
本文首先论证了股份制将导致所有权监督不足，培育充分竞争的市场体系是目前市场经济国家解决这一问题的主要手段，在市场约束缺乏的条件下，一味推进股份制改造，将会使国有企业从一种低效率走向另一种低效率；接着说明，由于"马太效应"的存在，旨在通过其他产权主体的加入来提高国企效益的思路有必要进一步探讨；如果国有股处于控股地位，国家将负担这种低效率企业的全部监督成本，其他产权主体搭国家的便车。鉴于此，国企改革应该是产权、环境和管理改革的三位一体，同步推进。
In this article, we prove that stock system will lead to incomplete property supervision, the main way to solve this problem is to foster complete competition market system. Blind transformation of stock system lack of external restraint mechanism required by stock system might lead to state－ owned enterprises from one kind of inefficiency to another. Then, because of Matthew Effect, it is necessary to further explore the train of thought in reform which aims at increasing the benefit of state－ owned enterprises through accession of other main body of property right. If the state is in domination, the state will bear the all supervision cost of inefficient enterprises. Therefore, the reform of state－ owned enterprises should be the reform of property right, environmental and management as an organic whole.
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2000年第11期20-23,共4页
China Soft Science
关键词
国有控制
产权主体
所有权监督
市场约束
黄金股控股制度
state holding in domination
main body of property right
property supervision
market restraint
gold share's controlling system
