摘要
为探索运输机场属地化改革后的安全监管机制,从运输机场与监管部门之间的博弈机理出发,综合考虑政企分离不彻底情况下利益双方人情关系对博弈结果的影响,采用不完全信息条件下的动态博弈理论,构建人情压力背景下运输机场监管的动态博弈模型。模型分析结果表明:降低监管成本,增加监管次数,降低运输机场的违章收益可以有效地提高运输机场安全生产的概率;声誉影响效应越大,监管过程越严格,运输机场安全生产的动力越大;一味地加大惩罚力度,反而会增加监管部门与运输机场合谋的概率。最后,提出了建立激励性监管约束机制和完善责任追究制度等相关措施。
In order to explore safety supervision mechanisms of transportation airports,the mechanism of gaming of airports with regulatory authorities were analyzed. The influence of human relationship on game results under the incomplete of enterprises from government administration separation condition was considered. A dynamic game model was built for airports safety regulation under the human relationship pressure background. Model results showed that： reducing regulatory costs or illegal gains of transportation airports can effectively improve the probability of work safety of airports,that both greater influence of reputation and a more rigorous regulatory process make work safety stronger,and that making the punishment heavier blindly will increase the probability that regulatory authorities collusion with transport airports. Recommendation were made for establishing incentive regulation restrainting mechanisms and improving the accountability system.
出处
《中国安全科学学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2014年第3期144-149,共6页
China Safety Science Journal
关键词
监管机制
人情压力
动态博弈
运输机场
策略
regulatory mechanism
human relationship pressure
dynamic game
transportation airports
tactics
