管理层权力与企业价值:基于产品市场竞争的视角被引量：39

Managerial Power and Firm Value:Based on the Perspective of Product Market Competition

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摘要以Tobin's Q衡量企业价值,以2007年至2012年中国上市企业为样本,采用单变量分析和多元线性回归方法,实证检验中国上市企业管理层权力对企业价值的影响、产品市场竞争对企业价值-管理层权力敏感性的影响。研究结果表明,中国上市企业面临的产品市场竞争程度显著影响企业价值对管理层权力的敏感性,当产品市场竞争激烈时,中国上市企业管理层拥有的综合权力对企业价值具有显著正向影响,具有较高的教育背景和持有企业股权的管理层能为企业带来更好的价值,总经理和董事长两职兼任以及较高的独立董事比例更有助于改善企业价值;产品市场竞争较弱时,企业价值与管理层权力综合指标以及管理层权力的不同维度之间均不存在显著相关性。研究结果表明赋予管理层适当的权力,同时提高产品市场竞争程度,能有效提高企业价值。 Employing Tobin＇s Q as measurement of finn value, based on the sample of listed firms in China during the period from 2007 to 2012, this paper investigates the impact of managerial power on firm value and the firm value-managerial power sensitivity under different product market competition by using univariate analysis and multivariate linear regression analysis method. The main empirical results indicate that the firm value-managerial power sensitivity differs under different product market competition in China. There is significantly positive relationship between firm value and managerial composite power when the product market competition is strong. The managers who own stakes, or have high level of education background may improve firm value, the du- ality of manager and chairman and higher proportion of independent directors have strong and positive influence on firm value un- der strong competition. There is no significant relationship between firm value and managerial power including composite index and all its dimensions when the product market competition is weak. These results demonstrate that both managerial power and product market competition can improve firm value.

作者谭庆美魏东一

机构地区天津大学管理与经济学部

出处《管理科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第3期1-13,共13页 Journal of Management Science

基金国家自然科学基金(71002104)~~

关键词管理层权力企业价值产品市场竞争敏感性 managerial power finn value product market competition sensitivity

分类号 F272 [经济管理—企业管理]

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