摘要
基于演化博弈理论,在利益均分和成本共担的假设前提下,引入激励与惩罚系数,并建立了群体博弈模型,对汽车售后O2O(online-to-offline)市场中的服务商合作行为进行了分析。通过推导复制动态方程得到的分析结果表明,在汽车售后O2O市场群体博弈模型中,成本、收益、激励与惩罚系数,以及初始合作者比例都是影响演化博弈稳定性的因素,根据实际情况设置合理的参数可以有效引导各方的行为。
Based on evolutionary game theory and with the hypothesis of cost - shared and profit - shared as premise, a group game model was built after introducing the incentive and punishment coefficient, by which the cooperation behaviors of service providers in auto after - sales 020 （ online to offline） market were analyzed. The game result derived from the replicated dynamic equation showed that： in the automotive after-sales 020 market group game model, the costs and benefits, incentive and penalty coefficient, as well as the initial cooperation ratio were all factors affecting the stability of evolutionary game. The reasonable settings set according to the actual situation would effectively guide the behavior of the parties.
出处
《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》
CAS
2014年第3期397-400,413,共5页
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172043)
国家科技支撑计划基金资助项目(2013BAH13F01
2012BAH93F04)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2012-YB-20
2012-JL-03)
武汉理工大学教研基金资助项目(2012112)
关键词
演化博弈
汽车售后
复制动态方程
产业链
evolutionary game theory
auto after- sales service
renlicated dynamics eauation
industry chain
