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基于淘宝直通车的竞价决策系统的研究与设计 被引量:1

Research and Design of Bidding Decision System Based on Taobao Train
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摘要 电子商务蓬勃发展的大环境下,广告主具有强烈的电商广告投放意愿,显然他们并未达到电商广告的核心业务SEM(搜索引擎营销优化)的专业要求。所以广告主希望借助第三方工具来进行搜索引擎广告投放的一站式服务来满足其业务需求。基于此,本文将提供一整套的竞价词托管式服务的解决方案。以淘宝直通车这一全新的搜索竞价模式作为研究对象,从语义抽取、关键词扩展、竞价词生成、模型化出价、广告效果正向反馈监控模型几方面进行分析和统计,为直通车广告主提供最优投放策略整体解决方案。第一阶段针对商品信息进行数据挖掘,实现关键词推荐引擎。第二阶段实现投放优化模块,实施定价策略,建立的点击量与PPC("平均点击花费")模型,实现在预算资金的约束下对不同竞价组合进行ROI(投入产出比)最大化的投资决策。以实际效果改善直通车竞价搜索用户体验。 Under the booming development of e-commerce, however, they neither know nor understand SEM business well, which has both high professional requirements and threshold of SEM (Search engine marketing and optimization). Advertisers are keen to use third-party tools to supply the one-stop service of search engine advertising to meet their business needs. Based on this, this article will provide a complete set of bidding word hosted service solutions. Taobao trains as a new search auction model as my subject of academic studies .After analyzing and collecting statistics of semantic extraction, keywords expansion, bid word generation, modeling bids, advertising effect positive feedback monitoring model, this thesis offers the optimal solution of placing advertising, I want to provide train advertisers the best overall solution delivery strategy. The first phase focuses on product information for data mining, to achieve keyword recommendation engine. Put in the second stage to achieve optimization module, the implementation of pricing strategy, the establishment of hits and PPC ("average click cost") model. It's restricted by budget, which is the realization of maximized ROI (input-output ratio) with different bid combination. It improves the practical effect of creating better experiences and advertising in train auction.
机构地区 上海交通大学
出处 《微型电脑应用》 2014年第6期16-20,共5页 Microcomputer Applications
关键词 竞价搜索 淘宝 直通车 搜索引擎 电子商务 Auction Search Taobao Taobao Train Keywords Search Engine Electronic Commerce
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参考文献10

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