摘要
研究委托人如何激励代理人对专用性人力资本进行投资 .代理人对人力资本投资的激励来自对未来报酬或职业发展的考虑 .但当投资是代理人的隐藏行动 ,而产出是委托人的私有信息时 ,由于出现双边败德行为 ,基于产出的报酬契约不能诱导代理人对专用性人力资本的投资 .职位提升机制能在一定程度上激励代理人的投资 ,但当委托人不提升从效率角度而言该被提升的代理人时 ,仍未能走出双边败德之困境 .当产出低时解聘代理人的解聘机制能消除委托方的机会主义行为 ,当人力资本的专用性较大 ,或投资的边际成本较小时 ,能诱导
This paper explores the design of incentive scheme to induce agent to invest in specific human capital, whose motivation to invest depends on career concerns. In case that investment is the agent's hidden action and productivity is the principal's private information, productivity contingent contract can't induce efficient investment due to double moral hazard. Both up or out contract and promotion contract can alleviate double moral hazard problem.But the efficiency of Promotion Scheme depends on the principal's reputation. Whereas up or out contract can achieve Pareto efficiency when human capital is specific enough, or the marginal cost of invest is low enough.
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
2001年第2期19-24,共6页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
美国 Dartmouth大学Tuck商学院亚洲及新型经济问题研究中心博士后研究基金资助项目
