摘要
运用奥尔森集体行动理论研究耕地保护的行动逻辑 ,对中央政府、地方政府、非农企业和农民耕地保护成本和收益构成要件的分析揭示耕地保护的经济学原因。得出的基本结论是 :中央政府和农民具有强烈的耕地保护倾向 ,地方政府和非农企业耕地保护的动力不足。要切实保护耕地 ,需要采取措施变动经济当事人特别是地方政府和非农企业的成本收益预算线 ,使其耕地利用决策符合国家的耕地保护政策目标。
Olson's Collective Action Theory was employed to research on the logic of PAL (protective arable land) action.The reason in economics for PAL has been revealed by analyzing the cost and revenue of PAL from the central government, the local governments, non-agricultural firms, and peasantry. The result indicates that the central government and peasantry tend to PAL, while the local governments and non-agricultural firms tend to capture arable land. The policy recommendation on PAL is provided: changing the cost and revenue budget line of the local governments and non-agricultural firms, causing the decision of utilizing arable land in accordance with the target of national PAL.
出处
《扬州大学学报（人文社会科学版）》
2002年第1期32-37,共6页
Journal of Yangzhou University(Humanities and Social Sciences Edition)
基金
江苏省教育厅人文社会科学基金项目 ( 0 0SJB6 30 0 0 2 )
