摘要
对赌协议因其阶段性和条件性支付特点,能缓解并购中由信息不对称引发的道德风险。通过构建不完全契约下并购对赌协议模型,研究了并购中嵌入对赌协议对并购主体的激励效应,发现:①对赌协议能有效激励并购方的投资行为,改善事前投资不足;②在一定条件下,并购方的投资水平与目标方的努力程度有正向协同作用。对中国动向与摩根士丹利的并购对赌案例分析结论与模型吻合。
The stage and conditional payment characteristics of earnouts can relieve the moral hazard problem caused by asymmetric information during mergers and acquisitions(M&As). This paper studies the incentive effect of earnouts embedded in the M&As based on the perspective of incomplete contract by constructing the earnouts model. The results demonstrate that, first, the use of the earnouts can effectively motivate the investment behavior of the acquirer; secondly, under certain conditions, there is a positive synergy effect between the investment of acquirer and the effort of the target. The analysis of case of China Dongxiang and Morgan Stanley is consistent with the conclusion of the model.
作者
李双燕
王彤
LI Shuangyan;WANG Tong(School of Economics and Finance,Xi'an J iaotong University,Xi'an710061,China)
出处
《系统管理学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第6期1036-1043,共8页
Journal of Systems & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71202076)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目
陕西省软科学项目(2014KRM40)
关键词
对赌协议
不完全契约
激励
earnouts
incomplete contracts
incentive
