摘要
政治晋升作为国企高管的重要激励方式,对于企业投资效率的影响存在"业绩论"与"关系论"的分歧,如何充分发挥政治晋升的激励效应,从而有效抑制国有企业的过度投资行为成为学者关注的焦点。因此,文章以2009—2016年沪深A股国有上市公司为研究样本,实证检验国企高管政治晋升对企业过度投资的影响结果与作用机制。研究表明,国企高管"内部晋升"与"外部晋升"对企业过度投资的影响存在差异,其中"外部晋升"显著提高了国有企业的过度投资程度,并且代理成本在"外部晋升"与企业过度投资关系中具有部分中介效应。其不仅揭示了国企高管"内部晋升"与"外部晋升"激励效应的差异性,证明了国有企业过度投资的"政治动机"存在性,同时对于提高国有企业投资效率以及促进国有企业激励机制改革具有一定参考价值。
Political promotion is an important incentive way for the executives of state-owned enterprises.There are differences between "performance theory" and "relationship theory" for the influences of political promotion on the efficiency of corporate investment. The method for full exerting the incentive effect of political promotion so as to effectively restrain the over-investment behavior of state-owned enterprises has become the focus of scholars. This paper takes the 2009-2016 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share state-owned listed companies as the sample, and empirically examines the influence results and mechanism for political promotion of state-owned enterprise executives on over-investment behavior. The research shows that there are differences between the influences of internal promotion and external promotion of executives of stateowned enterprises on the over investment, of which external promotion has significantly increased the degree of over-investment of state-owned enterprises, and the agent cost have some intermediate effects in the relationship between external promotion and over-investment. This study not only reveals the differences between the incentive effect of internal promotion and external promotion of state-owned enterprises executives, but also proves the existence of political motivation for over-investment in the state-owned enterprises. At the same time, it has certain reference value for improving the investment efficiency of stateowned enterprises and promoting the reform of incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprises.
作者
胡晓光
HU Xiaoguang(Business School,Liaoning University,Shenyang 110036,China;College of Business Administration,University of Science And Technology Liaoning,A nshan 114044,China)
出处
《辽宁大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第6期72-81,共10页
Journal of Liaoning University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家社会科学基金重大招标项目"国有企业改革与制度创新研究"(15ZDA026)
国家自然科学基金面上项目"竞争性国有企业混合所有制改革研究"(71472186)
辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目"中国国有上市公司高管政治晋升对过度投资的影响研究"(L15DGL001)
辽宁省教育厅青年基金项目"国企高管政治晋升对企业过度投资的影响机制研究"(2017LNQN31)
关键词
过度投资
政治晋升
代理成本
国有企业
over-investment
political promotion
agent cost
state-owned enterprises
