摘要
本文在随机需求下考虑质量改进情形下,研究制造商主导和传统零售商构成的双渠道供应链定价策略。基于博弈理论,建立Stackelberg博弈模型,运用两阶段优化法,分析了分散决策下两渠道需求和定价的最优决策,探讨质量改进对企业市场占有率、最优决策和效益的影响。研究表明:质量改进会影响企业最优定价策略,制造商为扩大产品市场占有率和获得更高的效益,会主动提高产品质量水平,但过高的产品质量水平对零售商是不利的;在制造商采取有效激励措施前,零售商不会主动提升零售渠道质量检验水平。
the optimal pricing strategy under the dual-channel supply chain consisting of a dominant manufacturer and a traditional retailer with stochastic demand and concerning quality improvement was researched. Based on game theory, the Stackelberg game model is established, using the two-stage optimization method, analyze the optimal decision of the demand and pricing of the two channels under decentralized decision-making, and to discuss the impact of quality improvement on market share, optimal decision-making and benefits of the enterprise. Research shows that quality improvement will affect the optimal pricing strategy of enterprises. Manufacturers will actively increase product quality levels in order to increase product market share and obtain higher benefits, but excessive product quality levels will be detrimental to retailers;Before manufacturers take effective incentive measures, retailers would not take the initiative to upgrade the quality inspection of retail channels.
出处
《价格理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第12期163-166,共4页
Price:Theory & Practice
关键词
双渠道供应链
质量改进
随机需求
定价策略
Dual Channel Supply Chain
Quality Improvement
Stochastic Demand
Pricing Strategy
