家族企业代理人治理机制研究——基于代理理论和嵌入理论被引量：3

Research on the Mechanism of Agent Governance of Family Enterprises Based on Agency Theory and Embeddness Theory

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摘要本文从传统代理理论出发,着重强调了激励、监督、绩效考核等对家族企业代理人治理机制的影响;并通过引入社会嵌入理论,从认知嵌入、权力嵌入、关系嵌入三个维度分析探讨使内部经理人与外部经理人相互制约、相互补充的有效路径;文章最后结合上述两种理论构建了一个家族代理人治理机制的模型,并详细阐述了其治理机制的作用机理。 This paper emphatically emphasizes the influence of incentives, supervision, performance-appraisal on family enterprises＇ agent governance mechanism from the traditional agency theory.With the aim to find out an effective path which make internal-managers and external-managers can restrict and complement each other,we introduce social embedding theory and discuss from three dimensions： cognizance,power, relationship. Finally combining the above two theories, this paper builds a model of agent governance mechanism of family enterprises, and its action mechanism were described in detail.

作者陈春花赖溢洲李梦雅

机构地区华南理工大学工商管理学院

出处《中国人力资源开发》北大核心 2014年第13期6-11,33,共7页 Human Resources Development of China

基金教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"我国领先企业管理实践蕴含的本土管理元素及其可移植性研究"(11YJA630004)资助

关键词家族企业代理理论嵌入理论治理模式 Family Enterprise Agency Theory Embeddedness Theory Governance Mode

分类号 F276.5 [经济管理—企业管理]

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