摘要
运用高新技术上市公司2008—2011年面板数据,实证研究了高管持股与研发投资关系.研究结果表明:对于研发投资战略,高管持股比例较低时具有利益趋同效应,随着持股比例增加,产生管理防御效应;股权性质微弱负向调节公司研发投资强度与高管持股之间的关系;股权集中度负向调节公司研发投资强度与高管持股之间的关系;股权制衡度微弱正向调节公司研发投资强度与高管持股之间关系.因此,适度的高管持股比例及制约大股东控制的影响将有利于公司加大研发投资.
It made an empirical research on managerial owership and R＆D investment based on the panel data of the listed high-tech companies from 2008 to 2011. The results indicate： When managerial ownership ratio is low, there are interest convergence effects, but managerial entrenchment effects produce with the managerial ownership ratio increasing ; State-owned listed companies have weakly negative effect on the relationship between R＆D intensity and the managerial ownership ratio; Ownership concentration has negative effect on the relationship between R＆D intensity and the managerial ownership ratio; Ownership balance degree has weakly postive effect on the relationship between R＆D intensity and the managerial ownership ratio. So appropriate managerial ownership ratio and restricting the impact of the large shareholder are beneficial to increasing R＆D investment.
出处
《研究与发展管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第4期23-31,共9页
R&D Management
关键词
高管持股
研发投资
利益趋同效应
管理防御效应
managerial ownership
R＆D investment
interest convergence effect
managerial entrenchment effect
