摘要
2008年金融危机后货币政策对银行风险承担的影响属于经济学界的新兴研究热点。基于2007—2012年14家上市银行的数据,运用GMM动态面板估计方法实证检验了货币政策对我国上市银行风险承担的影响并分析了非国有银行的风险承担行为。实证结果表明,宽松的货币政策会激励银行的风险承担,非国有银行对货币政策变动的反应更为敏感。此外激励效果的产生依赖于银行的资产负债表特征和宏观经济形势。
The 2008 financial crisis triggered a study on the impact of monetary policy on banks＇ risk-taking. Based on the data of 14 listed banks during 2007-2012, this study uses GMM dynamic panel estimation method to test the impact of monetary policy on risk-taking by China＇s listed banks and also analyzes risk-taking behaviors of non-state-owned banks. The empirical results show that loose monetary policy would give banks an incentive to undertake more risks, and non-state-owned banks are more sensitive to the changes in monetary policy. The results also find that the incentive effect depends on the feature of the banks＇ balance sheet and macro-economic situation.
关键词
货币政策
银行风险承担
金融稳定
监管
monetary policy
banks＇ risk-taking
financial stability
supervision
