摘要
地方政府的有限理性导致地方利益固化,造成区际生态恶化和区际环保公共物品供给不足。以区际纳什均衡作为路径选择,试图建立旨在打破行政边界刚性约束的羁绊,突破地方政府利益固化的藩篱,以经济内在联系为协调基石的区际生态补偿机制。文章以京冀地区流域生态联防联控为例,构建区际横向生态补偿机制模型并通过最优化该模型达到区际纳什均衡。
The limited rationality of local governments causes local interest curing and inter-regional ecologica! deterioration and insufficient supply of inter-regional environment-friendly public goods. With inter-regional Nash balance as the path choice, this paper tries to set up Inter-regional ecological compensation mechanism based on the internal link of economy, aims to break the barriers of rigid constraints of administrative boundaries and the interest curing of local governments. Taking the ecological joint prevention and control of the watershed of Beijing and Hebei region as an example, this paper builds inter-regional horizontal ecological compensation mechanism model and realizes inter-regional Nash balance by optimizing this model.
出处
《生态经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第10期140-144,182,共6页
Ecological Economy
基金
北京市哲学社科重点项目"首都经济圈的目标定位及战略重点研究"(11JGA012)
北京市自然科学基金项目"北京依托京冀建设世界城市的路径研究"(9112004)
北京市教委重点课题暨北京市哲学社会科学规划项目"北京建设世界城市与促进京冀一体化发展"(01691162710118)
关键词
地方政府有限理性
区际纳什均衡
京冀
流域
横向生态补偿机制
limited rationality of local governments
inter-regional Nash balance
Beijing and Hebei
watershed
horizontal ecological compensation mechanism
