摘要
现有研究鲜有讨论高水平审计师选择与高质量会计信息在传递信号方面是否存在替代性。本文基于我国发行信用债券的1891个企业样本,从信用评级视角出发,研究了高水平审计师选择与高质量会计信息的信号替代性。结果表明,拥有高质量会计信息的企业更可能选择高水平审计师,以强化其不会侵占投资者的信号效应,而且外部审计师选择信号和会计信息质量信号均得到了信用评级机构的正面评价。选择高水平审计师能够部分替代但不能完全替代高质量会计信息对信用评级的积极影响。
The existing research rarely discussed the accounting information in the transmission of signals. substitution between the high level auditor and the high quality Using 1891 firms issuing bonds in China, this paper study the substitution of signals between the high level auditor and the high quality accounting information from the perspec- tive of credit rating. We find that firms with high quality accounting information will be more likely to choose high quality auditor to further guarantee their signals of non-tunneling investors, and this incentive indeed has been rec- ognized by the credit rating agencies. Selection of high level auditors can partly replace but cannot completely replace the positive effect of high quality accounting information on credit rating.
出处
《审计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第5期77-85,共9页
Auditing Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:71372047
71302023)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(项目批准号:2012WYB35)
北京市高校青年英才计划(项目批准号:YETP0298)
北京市哲学社会科学规划项目(项目批准号:13JGB010)的资助
关键词
审计师选择
会计信息质量
替代性
信用评级
auditor choice, accounting information quality, substitution, credit rating
